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Abstract: This paper explores social policy-making role of supreme courts in India
and South Africa. It argues that that both significantly shaped social policy. But
neither imposed its will on elected government – both recognised that judicial power
is limited and sought negotiation with the government and other interests to ensure
compliance with rulings. Despite the difference between them, both courts promote
and support collective action by the poor or their allies in civil society. The paper
traces the institutional roots of the relative strength of the two courts and their
relations with their governments and links their rulings to the political environment.
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2The Limits of Prescription: Courts and Social Policy in India and South Africa
Do courts play a significant role in expanding social policy? If so, how do they play
this role and what is their impact? These questions are raised by perceptions that courts
in two BRICS countries, India and South Africa, have exerted significant influence over
the development of social policy in their countries. South Africa has been hailed as an
exemplar of effective judicial support for social and economic rights (Sunstein
2000/2001), while in India the court’s role is cited as an important source of social
policy reform (Hershkoff 2010). This view is, however, not universal: South Africa’s
court has been criticised for failing to do more to prescribe social policy (Dugard, 2008;
Albertyn 2011), while India’s was, at one point, a conservative force, seeking to
constrain the policies of a left-leaning national government.
This paper will argue that courts in both countries have played a role in expanding
social policy, but that it is important to place this in perspective. Neither court has
imposed its will on an elected government – both have recognised, implicitly or
explicitly, that judicial power is limited and have, therefore, sought to ensure that their
rulings are likely to win enough approval by the government and other interests to
ensure their implementation. Nor did they seek an adversarial relation with the
government – commonalities between the courts and the executive were at least as
important as their differences. Governments and ruling parties are not monolithic and
court rulings can strengthen the hand of sections of government who support a greater
social role, while judges often share broad perspectives with government office holders.
Central to our approach is the assumption that the role of the courts is essentially
political. This view is often resisted by jurists and legal scholars who either insist that
courts are guided by a purely legal logic or, at the very least, that their political
interventions are constrained by their need to convince legal practitioners that their
judgements are credible (Roux 2009). But this does not gainsay the reality that court
judgements are political interventions, in their effect and intent. On the first score, the
rulings affect the distribution of (scarce) resources. They also help to shape the social
policy environment by obstructing or assisting those within and outside governments
who fight for the adoption of particular social policies. On the second, the view that
courts in constitutional political orders simply hand down legal rulings which have no
political intent is contradicted by the courts’ history (e.g. Leuchtenberg, 1963). It is
widely accepted in constitutional democracies that judges are influenced by their values
and political positions, even if they are required to fashion judgements which will
convince other lawyers: this is why appointments to constitutional courts usually
require a political process.
This means that courts are one of the many actors who shape social policy in a political
process. And, like all such actors, they are obliged to take into account the power of the
other interests who also play a role in policy-making. We therefore argue that the courts
in India and in South Africa have been able to effect social policy-making not because
they tried to impose courses of action but because, in different ways, they avoided that
– the Indian court by engaging with the government, civil society and other actors in
the policy community and issuing orders and judgments that they knew were realistic
and feasible, its South African counterpart by concentrating on procedural remedies
rather than stipulating how the process should end. This suggests that the effectiveness
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but on recognising the limits of their power by taking into account that of other actors.
The paper will also point to differences between the two cases, of which the most
important is the Indian court’s willingness to prescribe policy outcomes in contrast to
its South African counterpart’s preference for introducing procedures rather than laying
down the specific of policy. Despite this difference, the success of both courts at
influencing social policies relies on one common denominator: through different
modalities, both have promoted and supported collective action by the poor themselves
or their allies in civil society. The South African Court has mandated the government
to engage in a dialogue with the poor and their representatives to find a shared solution
to their grievances. The Indian Court has based its rulings on a prolonged dialogue with
civil society organisations and the government of India. Hence, while in South Africa
the Court has mandated engagement with the poor, the Indian Court has facilitated this
dialogue before issuing an order. We argue that this is, at least in principle, more likely
to produce sustainable social policy and to support democratic politics than dictation
by the courts to the governments. Collective action by the poor themselves or their allies
in civil society are, in our view, not only more conducive to democracy because citizens
play a greater role in decisions but also far more likely to produce and sustain social
policy which is sympathetic to the poor: courts which enable this action rather than
dictating specific outcomes are thus likely not only to strengthen democratic decision-
making but also to enhance citizens’ ability to press governments to introduce social
policies aimed at addressing poverty and to ensure that those policies endure.
The purpose of this paper is not to add to legal scholarship by offering a comprehensive
account of the two courts’ role in social and economic rights jurisprudence – nor does
it claim to canvass fully scholarly debates on the socio-economic judgements of the two
courts. Because its purpose is to explore the political and policy impact of the courts’
roles, it discusses only those cases and scholarly opinions which are relevant to this
theme – a more detailed exposition and analysis of the South African case is contained
in a published article by one of the authors (Friedman, 2016). To understand the specific
role that the two supreme courts have played in shaping social policies, it is important
to begin by pointing out some institutional and political factors that have constrained
and shaped the courts’ role.
Socio-economic rights in India and South Africa
In principle, socio-economic rights (SER) in India and South Africa’s constitutions
have very different statuses. In South Africa, a wide range of SERs is constitutionally
protected, alongside civil and political rights (CPR). In principle, there is no difference
between the two categories of rights, as, according to Section 7 (2) of the Constitution,
the state ‘must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights’–
including SERs. However, the Constitution does differentiate between CPRs and SERs
by attaching to the latter an escape clause that mandates the state to “take reasonable
legislative and measurers, within its available resources” to fulfil these rights (emphasis
added). This obviously makes the enforcement of SERs more dependent on government
capacity and funding than CPRs. But it does not alter the reality that SERs are fully
justiciable – it is the court, not the government, which decides whether the recognition
of SERs is reasonable in the circumstances. In India, the constitution clearly
differentiates CPRs from SERs. The former are included in the ‘Fundamental Rights’
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are supposed to inspire the state’s policies. Hence, CPRs were fully justiciable, whereas
SERs were not.
In practice, however, despite the difference in constitutional provisions, the
justiciability of SERs is roughly comparable in South Africa and India. The Indian
Supreme Court, through successive rulings since the late 1970s, has expanded the scope
of the (justiciable) Article 21 of the Constitution (which protects the right to life), to
include, among others, the right to health, livelihood, education, shelter, drinking water
and food (Deva 2009:25). What the constitution explicitly gives the South African
court, its Indian equivalent has fashioned for itself through its jurisprudence. Both
courts therefore enjoy the power to shape social policy. Their willingness to do so is,
however, shaped by the context in which they operate, in particular the relation between
the court and the government and the relative strength of the two parties.
The Courts and the Government
What enables and constrains constitutional courts when they instruct governments to
fashion their social policies? Literature on the South African case offers a framework
for addressing this question, which is also applicable to the Indian case (and, indeed,
all others). It offers two competing explanations for the court’s role - oddly, both are
written by the same author, Theunis Roux. Both seek to explain why the court has been
able to hand down rulings which may have inconvenienced the government (Roux,
2009:106). First, he adopts an explanation which, although he does not say this, relies
on an approach akin to game theory. He rejects ‘political science accounts’ which see
the court’s rulings purely as political decisions rather than interpretations of the law –
because, as noted earlier, judges’ legitimacy in the legal community depends on
adopting ‘forms of reasoning’ acceptable to other lawyers (Roux, 2009:108). This, he
implies, implicitly sets up a confrontation between a court concerned with applying the
constitutional norms of the legal community and ‘the political branches’ which may be
offended by its rulings.
The court’s goal is thus to find strategies which will enable it to play its role despite the
likelihood that its ruling will force the government to do what it does not wish to do. It
employs a combination of principle and pragmatism in its attempt to do what legal
reasoning requires it to do while recognising the power of the government to bend the
court to its will. It must tread carefully and pick its battles prudently (Roux 2003: 97-
98). He uses this model to explain why the court has avoided, in the main, handing
down rulings which tell the government what its social policy should be and has instead
shown a ‘preference for procedural remedies that promote political solutions when
addressing social and economic rights claims’ (Ray 2011:108). In the only case in
which the court has instructed the government to adopt a policy – when it ordered the
provision of medication to prevent mother to child transmission of HIV –the
government was ‘politically isolated’ and ‘sliding toward an embarrassing political
defeat’. The court thus had no reason to fear it and ‘may even be said to have rescued
it by providing an "objective" legal basis for the reversal of its policies’ (Roux
2009:124/125).
The second view rejects the notion that courts and governments have fundamentally
different goals - loyalty to the legal community’s view of the constitution on the one
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reasoning seriously, this leaves much latitude for personal political perspectives to
shape judgements, which is why judges who win the respect of their colleagues are
clearly recognised as ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’. If, then, the political positions of most
constitutional court judgements were fundamentally at variance with that of governing
politicians, the government would constrain the court (Leuchtenberg 1963). So in this
view the court’s ability to continue ‘correcting’ government actions must be based not
on the difference between its goals and that of the government but on their similarity.
This does not mean that judges are government lackeys. But it does mean that they must
share enough of the government’s values to make it likely that it will tolerate the court.
In this view, constitutional jurisprudence – on SERs as well as all other issues - is not
a strategic game between actors with different goals but a conversation between jurists
and politicians who share goals, but differ on how to achieve them. Roux acknowledges
this: ‘Few constitutional courts anywhere in the world are independent in the strict
sense – composed of people with political views opposed to those of the governing
political elite’ (Roux 2003:94). While this interpretation of the judiciary’s
independence might appear too drastic – independence does not necessarily mean
opposition – Roux is right when he points out that the South African court has
comprised jurists who, while talented and independent, share a common ‘social
transformation project’ with the government. Disagreement is about means, not ends.
Indeed, Roux goes on to argue that, even when the court appears to be challenging the
government, it is, in reality, seeking to assist it by ensuring that its agenda for change
was procedurally fair and thus safeguarding it from political attack (since government
opponents are unlikely to challenge a ruling which seems to constrain it by telling it
how to implement its agenda) (Roux 2003:107).
At first glance this seems to be an elaborate conspiracy theory in which judges pretend
to impose courses of action on the government, so hiding their desire to support it. But
this is not required for this view to be accurate. All that is required is that judges who
broadly support the government’s goals should feel that they are best implemented if
different methods were used. It is also worth noting that the approach which stresses
competition between government and the courts tends to assume that governments
share a single mind and approach, which they rarely do: even rulings which impose on
some in government are, provided they remain within the shared value system, likely
to be supported by some within government. The South African case supports this view.
The vision shared by the courts and government can best be described as a common
commitment to work to end the effects of apartheid, the system of racial domination
which prevailed until 1994 and against which many post-1994 judges fought. This
appears to explain both the government’s willingness to accept the court’s rulings and
the court’s reluctance to instruct it to take action it might refuse to take. The result has
been a court which has ordered the government to revise policy but has, with only one
exception, stopped short of describing what it wants put in its place.
In India, there was no such clear-cut consensus between the judiciary and the
government. While there was a shared vision of a new India built after the colonial
regime, there was no agreement on what that meant. Thus, while Nehru’s post-
independence government proclaimed its intention to build a ‘socialist pattern of
society’, the courts protected the rights of elites, particularly the landed gentry. For the
first decades after independence, India’s main redistributive strategy was land reform.
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Congress) relied on the support of relatively rich landowners to distribute patronage
and extract votes (Frankel 2005). But another important reason for the failure of the
Indian state to redistribute land to the poor was the Supreme Court’s strenuous defence
of the right to property – a Fundamental Right – over the pursuit of social justice and
land redistribution (Austin 1999). In practice, in contrast to South Africa, whose
constitution protects property rights but also (in Section 36) enables the government to
override them if doing so is ‘reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom ‘there was no shared
commitment to the constitution as a ‘transformative’ document (Sunstein
2000/2001:4).
This ensured a different relationship between the court and the government to that in
South Africa. This relationship can be divided into two phases. The first was
characterised by a strong confrontation between the two institutions: the main issue at
stake was the socio-economic transformation that the Indian government wanted to
promote, which was opposed by the constitutional court. The conflict became more
intense in the late 1960s when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi moved to the left. A
vicious cycle was established, in which ‘the parliament [could] pass legislation, the
courts [could] determine its unconstitutionality, the parliament [could] try to
circumvent the courts by amending the constitution, the courts [could] pronounce that
parliament ha[d] limited powers of amendment, parliament…and so on and on’ (Mehta
2005:187). In the process, Gandhi tried to limit the independence of the judiciary
(Maiorano 2015, ch.4); this was strenuously resisted by the court until its final
capitulation during the emergency regime (1975-77), when it endorsed and legitimised
the suspension of democracy imposed by the Prime Minister. This was a major blow to
the Court’s reputation.
However, the defeat of Gandhi’s Congress party at the 1977 election was a turning
point for the Supreme Court. In an attempt to regain the confidence of public opinion,
the court sought to assume the role of the defender of the public interest, broadly
understood. This attempt included the defence of the interests of the disadvantaged
sections of the society (Mehta 2007). It is in this context that it made SERs justiciable
and introduced an instrument, Public Interest Litigation (PIL), which was intended to
give access to the court to the poor. It should be noted that defending the interests of
the poor was just one aspect of the Court’s strategy to regain public confidence. Its
increasing interventionism in areas like pollution, corruption and accountability
contributed in a very significant way to increase the Court’s reputation among the
middle class too. This is important for at least two reasons. First, this is a section of
India’s society that is extremely influential (Fernandes 2006); and, second, the middle
class is generally wary of increasing spending on the welfare of the poor, when this is
seen to reduce the projects designed to benefit them. However, the respect that the
Supreme Court enjoys among the middle class makes it easier for the latter to stomach
increased spending for the poor, when it is the Court that directs the government to do
so. In fact, middle class opposition to spending on the poor is also linked to a perception
that this is invariably a way to distribute patronage and feed a corrupt system. (see
Rothstein, Samanni, and Teorell 2012 on OECD countries). The court is much less
likely to be seen as a dispenser of patronage than politicians. In South Africa, middle
class resistance to anti-poverty measures exists but takes subtler forms, largely as a
result of the salience of race in the society’s politics. To oppose in principle measures
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lost legitimacy in the public debate: claims that the government wastes money which
could be spent on the poor is one weapon in the arsenal of those in the middle class
who seek to discredit a majority government.
The two courts have thus been able to influence policy for different reasons. In India,
the government and the court fought a war that the court first appeared to have lost
when it submitted to the state of emergency but eventually won, when the electorate
rejected Indira Gandhi after the proclamation of the emergency regime. After that, no
Indian government – and definitely not a Congress-led government – could afford to
be suspected of undermining the independence of the Court. The war with the
government was instrumental in putting the Court into a position of power – what
doesn’t kill you, makes you stronger. It has also been suggested that the Indian court
has been strengthened by a political context in which no party was able to form a
government on its own between 1989 and 2014. This severely eroded the central
government’s ability to centralise power and to interfere with the functioning of the
country’s institutions (Manor 2016). The Court has been able to fill ‘a governance
vacuum’ (Deva 2009: 30) created by a series of weak central governments. In the South
African case, as noted earlier, it was the commonality between the court and the
political elite which has allowed the court to play a role in social policy. This makes
the position of the Indian court far stronger than that of its South African counterpart
since it has proven public support which constrains political attacks on it. South
Africa’s court has not tested its support and so it is possible that it would be unable to
withstand a similar attack to that which its counterpart faced in India.
This may well have important implications for the respective styles of the two courts.
We will argue that mandating negotiation rather than imposing outcomes shows a
clearer understanding of the appropriate boundaries for a court in a democracy, partly
because it respects the choices of citizens (in particular those of the poor). But that does
not necessarily mean that this is why the South African court has chosen the former
path and the Indian court the latter. The nature of its relationship with government may
make the South African court more wary of intruding too much into policy-making,
while the Indian court may have been emboldened by its experience. This shows that
political context is a far more reliable determinant of the influence of courts than
constitutional texts: South Africa’s court has the formal power to impose outcomes but
largely chooses not to. India’s does not (on SER cases) but has fashioned out of political
circumstances the latitude to do what its counterpart is legally entitled to do. In both
cases, politics, not what the constitution says, is decisive.
In India, since the early 1980s, the government has abandoned land reform as its main
poverty-reduction strategy (Maiorano 2015, ch. 3), which had been a major issue of
confrontation between the two institutions. Since then, the government has focused on
specific policies and programmes to tackle poverty and the Supreme Court has been
very active in trying to ensure their effective implementation, despite the fact that, as
noted earlier, it did not have a strong history of intervening on behalf of the poor
(Rajagopal 2007). However, both the government and the Court share a ‘minimalist’
vision for India’s development according to which at least something must be done for
the poor. On the other hand, as we have already noted, the more cordial relation between
the Court and the government is also due to their respective power positions. It has been
argued that the Supreme Court was able to assert itself mainly because of the increasing
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Shankar 2009). However, the Court’s activism started at least one decade earlier as a
consequence, of its strategy of regaining the confidence of the public opinion (Mehta
2007); and, as a response to the growing assertiveness of a number of ‘non-party
political movements’ during the 1970s which were empowered by the new ways to
access the Court and tackle public interest issues in the presence of an unresponsive
government (Ruparelia 2013a). In this situation, the government simply did not have
the strength to confront an increasingly popular and increasingly active Supreme Court.
This was true during the 1980s – when major crises in Punjab, Assam and Kashmir
kept the government busy – and in the 1990s, when the fragmentation of the party
system further solidified the Court’s position. This helped to shape a relationship
between the two institutions which was less adversarial and more collaborative. As in
South Africa, the court’s role is less about getting the government to do what it does
not wish to do and more about trying to get it to pursue its own stated goals more
vigorously. The Indian court is also arguably as sensitive of the limits of its power –
and thus of the need to seek support for its rulings – as its counterpart, since it does
negotiate its judgement with government and civil society organisations. In both
countries the government and the constitutional court have a relation that is far less
adversarial than analyses which stress the divergent goals of the two institutions
suggest. This too helps explain why the two courts are able to play a role in shaping
social policy.
Even in India, where the court has fought a battle with the government over its power
to interpret the constitution, the ‘game theory’ view of the relationship between them,
in which their competing goals requires the court to develop a strategy to maximise its
influence, does not describe the dynamics adequately. While the Indian court may have
achieved greater freedom to act by taking on the government, it, too, appears to
recognise that its influence rests primarily on seeking to work with it. Throughout the
world, courts are limited by their need to garner support in other institutions (Gauri and
Brinks 2008) and both cases confirm that courts are likely to influence policy only if
there is a significant degree of consensus between them and the government.
The approach of the two courts
However, despite these broad commonalities, the two judicial institutions have adopted
differing approaches to the protection and extension of SERs which require further
discussion. While the Indian court has, by and large, limited itself to asking the
government to implement policies as they were meant to be implemented, it has
sometimes assumed a direct role in policy-making and has even taken on some
executive functions (Sathe 2002). In South Africa, direct intrusions into the legislative
domain occurred only twice. The court has sought to enforce the SER provisions of the
constitution in two ways. First, it has applied the ‘reasonableness standard’ which,
according to Roux, requires it ‘to assess whether a social programme unreasonably
excludes the segment of society to which the plaintiff belongs’. It relies on tests of fair
process, not on determining policy outcomes. (Roux 2003:97). Second, it has
repeatedly ordered the state authorities to negotiate outcomes with the poor, in order to
find a mutually acceptable solution to the dispute between them.
While both courts have been widely praised for their innovative and effective approach
to the protection of SERs (Gauri and Brinks 2010, Epp 1998), neither has (despite much
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a ‘minimum core content’, by specifying the minimum which the government is
expected to provide to comply with the SER provisions of the constitution.
South Africa
Since 1994, South Africa’s court has intervened in a variety of cases with social policy
implications. But its reputation for ‘pro-poor’ intervention is based primarily on two
cases dealing with housing and health respectively.
Given the amount of legal academic ink spilt on discussing the court’s role in SER
jurisprudence, it would be easy to conclude that it had devoted much of its time it. Some
of its more enthusiastic supporters tend not to mention that its earliest social and
economic rights ruling, the 1997 Soobramoney case, was a refusal to come to the aid
of a critically ill patient who asked it to order a public hospital to offer him dialysis
treatment. In reality, it has handed down judgments which deal with housing, health,
education, water and the financing of municipal services – but these have been
relatively sparse. The view that the court has played a substantial role is, therefore,
based on an assumption of quality rather than quantity – it assumes that the limited
number of rulings have wielded significant influence on policy and practice. This is
probably true of all or most judicial systems in which SERs are justiciable – while the
impression is sometimes created that the courts can be a frequent remedy for people
seeking to enforce their social and economic rights, their use is usually sparing, its
effect judged by the ripples it sends through the legal system and society.
The first judgment on which the court’s reputation is built is that in the 2001 Grootboom
case. It was brought on behalf of homeless people living on a field from which the
provincial authorities wished to evict them, and the court partly upheld a lower court
judgement ordering the government to devise a housing policy which would provide
for the needs of the plaintiffs and people in similar circumstances. The ruling had little
or no impact on Irene Grootboom, the homeless person in whose name the application
was brought, or her community. While the applicants were not evicted, they did not
benefit directly from a government housing programme and, as critics of the court never
tire of pointing out (much to the irritation of its defenders), Grootboom died without
receiving a house (Tolsi, 2012). But the case has subsequently been used to secure court
orders compelling municipalities to devise housing policies which would provide for
the needs of the poor rather than to evict them (LRC, 2004). It has also been argued that
the judgement fundamentally moved property law in a direction favourable to the
vulnerable because it ‘dislodged the normality assumption that an owner is entitled to
exclusive possession of his property…’ (Albertyn, 2011: 597).
The second was the 2002 Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) mentioned earlier, one of
only two occasions on which it directly ordered the government to adopt a particular
policy (rather than to initiate a process such as framing a policy or initiating
negotiations). The context was TAC’s sustained campaign to press the government to
introduce a comprehensive treatment regime for people living with the virus and in
particular to supply them with anti-retroviral medication (Friedman and Mottiar, 2005).
The ruling attracted attention both because of the extensive publicity which the battle
received and because it ruled against the government on an issue on which it felt very
strongly – the Minister of Health initially threatened to ignore the judgement if it went
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against the government (but was almost immediately forced to retract) (Roux, 2009:
124): ‘The intrusive nature of the remedy sought, together with a climate of public
distrust over the ANC government's policies on AIDS, made Treatment Action
Campaign one of the most politically controversial cases to come before the (Court) in
the first ten years of its existence…’ (Roux 2009:134).
The other case in which the government was ordered by the court to adopt a specific
policy was the 2004 Khosa case in which it ordered the government to extend social
security benefits, until then available only to South Africans, to permanent residents
from other countries (the plaintiffs were Mozambicans). While this could well have
become a controversial ruling in a political climate resistant to extending any
entitlements to foreigners, the number of people affected was relatively small and so
the court’s ruling went almost unnoticed.
Since those halcyon days, the court has, in the view of legal scholars and activists, failed
to realise the constitution’s potential for intervention on behalf of the poor and
vulnerable. None of its subsequent rulings have attracted the enthusiasm which
Grootboom and TAC evoked – a decision in the Mazibuko case in which the court also
rejected the argument that it should force the state to provide the poor with a ‘minimum
core’ of services (in this case a significantly increased entitlement to free water) has
also been attacked for ignoring the interests and needs of the poor (Dugard, 2010).
Legal scholars have criticised the court’s insistence on judging government actions by
whether they are ‘reasonable’ rather than by whether they conform to minimum core
content – a minimum floor of entitlements for the poor (Ray, 2011; Roux, 2003). In this
view, the court has, in its desire to avoid antagonising government or private economic
power-holders, failed to realise the promise of the earlier judgements.
This view ignores the fact that the court has handed down some significant rulings, of
which perhaps the best-known is the 2009 Abahlali Basemjondolo decision to strike
down a provincial law permitting the eviction of shack-dwellers on the grounds that the
authorities had a duty to ‘ensure that [residents’] housing rights are not violated without
proper notice and consideration of other alternatives’. The case was brought by shack-
dwellers’ movement, Abahlali basemjondolo, which has been engaged in a bitter
conflict with the KwaZulu Natal provincial government: the authorities have been
accused of trying to drive the movement out of shack settlements, both because it
challenged the local political elite and, later because it had successfully brought the
court action (Sacsis, 2009). The court has also handed down rulings instructing local
governments to engage with residents threatened with eviction (Wilson, 2011). In 2013
it overruled a decision by the governing body of a suburban school to exclude a pupil
on the grounds that it had reached its capacity. This seemingly technical issue goes to
the heart of some of South Africa’s race and class divisions – the power of (mostly
white) suburban school governing bodies to exclude poor black learners. It has also
intervened to strike down discrimination against women in customary marriage and
inheritance.
Some of these rulings have constrained the government, others have done the same to
private power-holders. The image of a court unwilling to intervene on behalf of the
poor if this means trampling on the toes of the powerful is inconsistent with its record
in the decade since Grootboom and TAC.
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Why the court should have sought to play this role – and why the government has
allowed it do this – has been discussed above. In contrast to India’s court (see below),
South Africa’s has not overtly sought to negotiate its rulings with the parties – the
prevailing legal culture would find that unacceptable. But nor has it sought to tackle the
government in an adversarial manner, as its critics would like. Whether this is
calculated or a sign of its commonality with the government, it has been concerned at
all times to not step outside the consensus that the goal of policy is to counter
apartheid’s effect on society. As a consequence, it has ruled on whether particular
measures are reasonable given the government’s stated goals and has sought to
substitute negotiation for laying down a minimum core of entitlements. But this has
not diminished its influence. On the contrary, it may be precisely why it has been able
to come to the aid of people threatened with eviction or seeking greater access to public
health care. And, as we will argue below, its insistence on negotiation, while it may be
shaped more by prudence than innovation, is a greater potential advance for the poor
than the prescriptive role which its critics urge it to pursue.
India
India’s court’s role in social policy-making has expanded since the introduction of the
PIL. In Common Law systems, only those whose rights are directly affected by a
dispute can approach the court. The introduction of the PIL in the 1980s by the Supreme
Court allowed any person or organisation to approach the court through a letter or a
petition in cases involving the public interest. Since then, the court has heard PIL on a
wide variety of subjects, ranging from environmental and poverty issues, women and
prisoners’ rights, to Richard Gere’s ‘obscene’ kiss of an Indian actress, Shilpa Shetty.1
While the objective of PIL was to grant access to the Court to the disadvantaged, among
the tens of thousands of letters received by it, only a handful has made it to trial (Gauri
2009:10). Moreover, NGOs and civil society organisations seldom choose to approach
the court in their campaigns, as they find the process extremely costly and time-
consuming (Shankar and Mehta 2008). Only the richest NGOs can afford litigation as
a constituent part of their campaigns: according to Krishnan (2003: 24), 56 per cent of
the NGOs in the richest quintile use litigation, but only 7 per cent in the bottom quintile
do. In fact, many PILs are introduced by individuals - lawyers in many cases. This does
not mean, however, that NGOs and civil society organisation do not use Court’s rulings
in their campaign. Quite the contrary, as we shall see below, these are a very powerful
tool in the hands of the supporters of an expanding welfare state. Only rich NGOs may
be able to afford to go to court, but there are enough of them in India to ensure a
significant number of SER-related cases. It is also possible for a single case to impact
on a range of policies. Despite the constraints mentioned here, PIL is important as a
‘judge-made human rights mechanism’ (Birchfield and Corsi 2010:715). The most
significant SER case on which the court has ruled was the product of a PIL.
In April 2001, the People Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) filed a ‘writ petition (196
of 2001)’ on the right to food in the Supreme Court. In 2001, vast areas of India were
suffering from a severe drought for the third consecutive year. Starvation deaths and
acute hunger were reported throughout the country. The petitioners argued that this was
a violation of the right to life protected by article 21 of the Constitution, which,
according to several Supreme Court rulings (e.g. Francis Coralie Mullin vs. The
Administration, 1981), included the right to food. They also presented compelling
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evidence that food stocks had reached unprecedented levels and that millions of tonnes
of food grains were left rotting instead of being distributed to drought-affected
households. The petitioners asked the court to order the government of India and six
state governments to distribute food through the Public Distribution System (PDS) and
to provide drought relief provided for by the famine codes. In effect, the petitioners
asked the government to respect its own laws and to implement its own schemes in the
way it was meant to be implemented in order to respect people’s fundamental rights.
An important factor often forgotten in the literature is the role of individual judges. One
of the PUCL’s lawyers (Colin Gonsalves) recalls that at the first hearing of the case he
did not even have to argue. The presiding judge, Justice Kirpal, opened the hearing by
saying ‘this cannot be. We cannot allow the state of affairs to continue’ (Gonsalves
2011:8). When the Attorney General, Soli J. Sorajbee, tried to argue that the Indian
state did not have the necessary resources to end hunger, Justice Kirpal told him ‘to cut
the flab somewhere else’ or ‘we will tell you how to do it’ (Gonsalves 2011:9). But
only a few years before, a very similar petition (Kishan Pattanaik vs State of Orissa
1989), had been dismissed because the judges felt that there was no reason not to trust
that the government would take the necessary steps to avoid hunger. In the Right to
Food case, however, the Court not only accepted the petition, but, in an order dated 23
July 2001, invited the petitioners to implead all other state governments, making the
case a nation-wide litigation. Differences in approaches between judges partially
explain the inconsistent approach of the Court to the protection of SERs (Rajagopal
2007) and its selective intrusion into policy-making. In some cases, it felt that it did not
have the authority to intrude, especially if this had important budgetary implications; at
other times, it did not exercise this restraint (Deva 2009:37).
The right to food case also exemplifies India’s Supreme Court’s approach to the
protection and promotion of SERs, which has been termed conditional upon state action
(Khosla 2010). Khosla rightly argues that the Court has seldom conceptualised SERs
as absolute rights of every individual. Rather, its rulings have repeatedly emphasised
that a violation of a given SER ‘can only occur when the state undertakes an obligation,
but does not fulfil it’ (Khosla 2010:751). While this approach is arguably more modest
than the South African court’s much criticised ‘reasonableness’ standard, in some
cases, the Court went well beyond that, assuming a role ‘strikingly similar to law-
making’ (Birchfield and Corsi 2009: 700) in two ways.
First, in the right to food case, in an order dates 28 November 2001, it converted eight
food-related government schemes into legal entitlements. This was a major intrusion
into policy-making. Government schemes in India are designed and implemented by
line ministries, but are seldom backed by an act of the national Parliament. They can,
at least technically, be discontinued or amended through a simple government order.
Moreover, if beneficiaries of a government scheme feel that they are denied their due,
they cannot go to court. A Supreme Court order in November 2001 radically changed
this. Not only are the provisions of the schemes mentioned in the order fully justiciable;
but, following another court order dated 27 April 2004, these schemes cannot be
‘discontinued or restricted in any way without the prior approval of [the] Court’.
Second, the Court has ordered the government to amend some schemes, even when this
had major financial implications. Perhaps the most striking example is the
universalisation, in an order dated 7 October 2004 of the Integrated Child Development
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Services (ICDS), India’s main policy to tackle child malnutrition. The Court ordered
the government to open an ICDS disbursement centre in every single habitation of the
country and not to restrict access to the programme in any way. This meant opening
800,000 centres in addition to the existing 600,000 and had major financial
implications.
The Supreme Court has also expanded its ambit into the executive domain. In
particular, it has entrusted the responsibility for implementing its orders (and therefore,
of welfare schemes) to the Chief Secretary (the highest ranking officer) of each state
government, creating, in an order dated 8 May, 2002, an accountability structure that
overlaps and sometimes collides with that designed by the state governments for the
implementation of those schemes. It said, in an order dated 29 October 2002, that, if
people die of starvation, ‘the Court may be justified in presuming that its orders have
not been implemented and the chief secretaries/administrators of the states/Union
Territories may be held responsible for the same’. Second, in an order on the same date,
it established its own monitoring system through the appointment of two
Commissioners to whom it granted extensive powers, in particular to investigate any
violation of the orders and to demand corrective actions from the state governments.
The powers of the Commissioners go further, as the Court has empowered them to
monitor any food-related ‘measures and schemes’, even if they are not specifically
mentioned in the orders. The Commissioners’ reports significantly influenced the
shaping of the court’s orders: when the Court suggested giving priority to the
appointment of Dalits (former untouchable castes) as cooks in the Midday Meal
Scheme - an important change since traditionally, upper caste people are not supposed
to eat food cooked by Dalits), a programme which provides one cooked meal to every
child enrolled in public schools, it did so on the suggestion of the Commissioners
(Hassan 2011:5).
This intrusion into policy-making is, however, the exception rather than the rule. The
Indian court’s judgements often seem more intrusive than they really are because they
often entail ordering the government to do what it is committed to doing but has not
done. For example, in an order dates 28 November 2001, it ordered all state
governments to implement the Midday Meal Scheme. Before the order, only Tamil
Nadu and Gujarat were implementing it. While this seems like a major intrusion into
policy-making, the Court was simply ordering that the scheme be implemented in the
manner the government intended: all states were supposed to provide a cooked meal to
all children enrolled in public primary schools. Similarly, it has issued extremely
specific guidelines for the scheme, laying down minimum calorific requirements of the
meals or the financial arrangements between the central and the state governments. But
again these guidelines did not lay down a minimum core content of the right to food;
they simply reiterated the government’s own policy guidelines. The Court has, in most
cases, asked the government to do what it had committed to do. This applies to most
schemes covered by Supreme Court orders.
A further qualification stems from repeated statements by the judiciary and the
government’s representatives that the right to food case was not adversarial, but a
collaborative project (Deva 2009:26). In reality, most Supreme Court orders are the
result of a dialogue between the Court, the network of civil society organisations led by
the PUCL, and the government. For example, at the beginning of the case, the Court
had proposed to the government that it distribute excess food stock free of charge. The
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government replied that it could not afford that and proposed to impose a nominal price,
which is what the court directed in its orders. (Interview, N. C. Saxena, 13/1/ 2016) In
another instance, the Court asked the government if it agreed with the number of ICDS
centre to be opened as proposed by the petitioners. The government argued that the
number was slightly too high, but in this case the Court, in an order dated 7 October
2004, argued that the evidence provided by the government was not convincing and it
endorsed the view of the petitioners. That the orders are not impositions on a reluctant
government can also be inferred from the occasional willingness of the government to
go beyond the guidelines issued by the Court. For example, the government
autonomously revised the minimum calorific requirements of the Midday meals (from
300 to 450 calories) without any input from the Court.
Another sign that this was not an adversarial process is that the government showed no
interest in introducing legislation to nullify the orders. Many of the court’s rulings are
based not on an interpretation of the constitution, but on its reading of existing laws. In
these cases, it can override the court: the most notable was the Shah Bano case in the
mid-1980s, when Parliament voted to overcome a Supreme Court judgment granting
the right to alimony to a divorced Muslim woman. Not only has Parliament not found
the intrusion of the Court into policy-making in the right to food case inconvenient
enough to amend the law – since 2004, it has passed laws which incorporate many
provisions in the Court’s orders, a sign that there is a relative consensus between it and
the court on right to food issues.
Nor is the right to food case an isolated example of apparent consensus. According to
N.C. Saxena (the Commissioner to the Supreme Court), in most cases the government
is quite happy about the court orders. (Interview, Saxena) Committing resources to the
poor has been very difficult for Indian governments, as it prompts strong reaction from
a section of the middle class which sees welfare schemes as ‘handouts’ at best,
patronage politics at worst.2 However, if the Supreme Court orders a welfare measure
it is easier for the government to commit the resources and, more generally, to take
what would otherwise be politically difficult (perhaps even unfeasible) decisions. Even
when the Court goes beyond the government policy guidelines, this is the result of the
triangular dialogue between civil society organisations, the state and court (including
the Commissioners).
Much of the dialogue between the Court and the state governments is mediated by the
Commissioners. They are immensely respected figures who, through formal and
informal contacts with key implementers and policy-makers at the state level, are able
to negotiate important policy correctives that often prevent further intrusions into
policy-making by the Court. In fact, much of the ‘effectiveness in achieving
implementation often stems from [the Commissioners’] diplomatic relations with the
state governments’ (Birchfield and Corsi 2009: 729).
To sum up, India’s Supreme Court’s conceptualises SERs as conditional upon state
action. Rather than adopting a minimum core content approach to define what a given
SER means, the recurring feature of the Court’s rulings is to push for the proper
implementation of those policies that the government had committed to implement on
its own initiative or to amend those policies on the basis of an evidence-based dialogue
with civil society and the government.
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Less is More: The Importance of Citizen Agency
In theory, a court which tells the government what to do would seem more likely to
ensure egalitarian social policy. But both theory and practice suggest that it is less likely
to do this.
At the normative level, the training and expertise of judges does not equip them to
choose between competing social policy options. Democratic principle requires that
decisions be taken by citizens, either directly or through elected representatives. The
‘proceduralisation’ of social and economic rights (Ray 2011:107) is thus a recognition
that policy should be made by elected representatives, provided that they follow
democratic procedures. And a court which orders a public authority to engage with
plaintiffs allows citizens to decide rather than imposing a ‘minimum core’ for social
services on them. It also enables the agency of the poor by ensuring that their
organisations enjoy a say in the outcome. It understands ‘transformative
constitutionalism’ not as ‘achievement of certain tangible results or outcomes’ but as
‘the radical change of the institutions and systems that produce results themselves’.
(Solange 2011:456).
On the first score, respect for elected representatives, the American legal scholar
Cass Sunstein argues that the South African court’s stress on procedure solves
the problem of how courts can intervene on the side of the poor without
removing the prerogatives of elected governments. It was respectful of
democratic prerogatives and of the limited nature of public resources, while also
requiring special deliberative attention to those whose minimal needs are not
being met. It therefore did not pre-empt democratic deliberation, but ensured
‘democratic attention to important interests that might otherwise be neglected
in ordinary debate (Sunstein 2000/2001:123).
On the second, it has been argued that a stress on negotiation is an ‘emphasis on
participatory democracy and the ability of procedural remedies to democratise the
rights-enforcement process’ (Ray 2011:107).
But the stress on negotiated outcomes is also more likely to ensure more enduring and
sustainable social policy. Policy is rarely sustainable unless those who benefit from it
can act collectively not only to achieve policy change, but to ensure that it is
implemented. This is illustrated by the fact that, almost a decade after the South African
court’s celebrated Grootboom ruling which held that people may not be evicted unless
housing is available, residents of the Johannesburg inner city were still fighting
evictions (Wilson 2011). The judgement’s effect was limited because it was not
accompanied by collective action by the original plaintiffs or by others in the years after
the judgement. By contrast, the TAC judgement, which was accompanied by collective
action, was followed by substantial increases in public provision of the therapy sought
by campaigners (Thom: 2013). And a successful campaign to prevent evictions in inner
cities (Wilson 2011) shows that even a modest infusion of collective action into housing
disputes can produce very different results from those in Grootboom.
Stuart Wilson, one of the lawyers who fought the legal battle on behalf of residents,
argues that recourse to the law was a product of tenants’ weakness – the ‘organisational
resources’ needed to sustain a successful campaign ‘were simply not present’ (Wilson
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2011:137/138). But there were ‘grassroots organisations’ operating in the inner city
who attempted to link residents to legal assistance (Wilson 2011:140). After the court
mandated engagement between the authorities and the plaintiffs, the parties negotiated
and reached a settlement which ‘represented an almost comprehensive surrender on the
City’s part’. (Wilson 2011:148) The court’s ruling mandating engagement is credited
with ending the evictions and enabling residents to exert at least some influence on their
future. In another case in which negotiation was mandated, a non-governmental
organisation assisting people who were evicted reported that: ‘It was only after the
Court ordered engagement over the details of the eviction process itself… that the
government finally took seriously… key demand of the residents’ (Cited in Ray
2011:113). While courts cannot substitute for citizen organisation, where even weak
organisation exists, rulings have assisted collective action which seeks social policy
more attuned to the needs of the weak. The result is likely to be more effective policy
gains than those which might be accompanied by simply mandating policy outcomes.
Despite the fact that the Indian court has occasionally intruded into the legislative and
executive domains, its approach is closer to that in South Africa than might appear from
a reading of its judgements. Its rulings have been based on a dialogue with both the
government of India and civil society organisations (led by the PUCL) that negotiated
on their behalf. Given PUCL’s and the Right to Food Campaign’s (RTF, a nation-wide
network of activists, academics, and concerned citizens that has played a prominent
role in supporting the right to food case) long experience and involvement with the poor
at the grassroots, this has ensured that what the judges ordered was not only reflective
of the views of an important section of the poor; it also ensured its legitimacy in the
eyes of the central government which, because it was party to the judicial process, did
not see the Court’s orders as the policy choices of a few unelected judges.
Of course, simply mandating negotiation does not ensure that citizens in need of social
policy interventions will be able to negotiate on equal terms with the authorities – the
balance of power is clearly stacked against them. But courts do not need to restrict
themselves to ordering negotiation – they can also impose on the authorities obligations
which make it more likely that they will take seriously the concerns of their bargaining
partner (Ray 2011: 125/126) This suggests that effective social policy can best be
protected by insisting on a ‘minimum core’ – but of engagement, not of substantive
outcomes. This is unlikely to substitute for severe power imbalances – but it can act as
a catalyst for effective collection action to achieve and maintain social policy gains.
Conclusion: The Effectiveness of Modesty
The evidence presented here suggests that courts can contribute to a more expansive
social policy regime capable of addressing not only poverty and inequality, but power
imbalances of which they are a symptom. But it suggests too that their role is modest.
Not only have they been most effective when they have supported the collective action
and organisation of activists and the poor, but a key to their influence is a recognition
of the limits to their power.
Despite the different approach of the two courts to mandating outcomes, both have
influenced the shaping of their countries’ welfare regimes by recognising the limits
within which they are forced to function. Even when courts seem to enjoy great power
on paper, they have no power to impose their rulings on governments or society. They
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rely on the tacit or express consent of those who their rulings affect and so, as Roux
(2009) points out in relation to governments, they are forced to finds ways of ensuring
that their rulings are accepted and implemented which recognise the power of those
who they judge. Not only is simply imposing rulings likely to be resisted – it could
delegitimise the authority of the court if its orders are regularly disregarded. A purist
view of rights is likely to make it more difficult to entrench them: ‘creating rights which
cannot be enforced devalues the very notion of rights as trump’ (Deva 2009:36). Once
courts have ruled, their rulings are only likely to be implemented by a reluctant
government if the organisations and activists which sought the judgement act to ensure
that what the court orders is done (Friedman and Mottiar 2005).
Whether courts tell governments what to do and whether governments listen is also
shaped by the political context. This is illustrated by the South African TAC case
discussed above and by the response to the Indian Court’s order to the government to
universalise the ICDS in November 2001. At the time, the order to universalise ICDS
was completely ignored with no consequence. Two subsequent orders issued in 2004
were substantially ignored too. It was only with the order of December 2006 that the
government started to act. This was not due to a sudden realisation that it was supposed
to respect the court’s orders but the changed political landscape. At least four factors
contributed to open up a window of opportunity. First, the Congress-led United
Progressive Alliance (UPA) had included the universalisation of the ICDS in its
electoral manifesto. Second, in late 2006 two reports (FOCUS 2006; NFHS-3 2006)
were published that showed that almost half of the country’s children were
undernourished. They received national (e.g. The Hindu 2006) and international media
attention (e.g. NYT 2007). The extent of child malnutrition revealed by the reports
shocked the country, especially the urban middle class. (Interview Neerja Chowdhury,
New Delhi, 9/8/2013). Third, the two reports galvanised civil society groups to
campaign for the respect of the Supreme Court’s orders and to increase efforts to tackle
child malnutrition. Fourth, civil society activists had penetrated policy-making agencies
since the victory of the UPA at the 2004 elections. In particular, the key actors were
grouped around the RTF Campaign. Many people associated with the campaign were
members of the National Advisory Council, some others were advisors to the Planning
Commission or ministries, while still others worked with the Special Commissioners to
the Supreme Court. The Commissioners themselves have strong personal and
professional links with activists of the Right to Food Campaign. In other words, the
ideas generated within the RTF Campaign penetrated to a significant extent into policy
circles, and their pressures were effective in bringing the attention of the government
to the issue of child malnutrition and the respect of the court’s orders.
Eventually, the ICDS was nearly universalised and the budgetary allocations were
increased by more than 450 per cent between 2004/05 and 2013/14. A similar story
explains the universalisation of the Midday Meal Scheme. The Courts’ orders were
ignored for a long time, until the RTF Campaign and other organisations started pushing
for respect of the orders and a relatively progressive new government – or at least
influential members within it or influential upon it – was open to be pushed in that
direction.
Even then, however, the Supreme Court’s orders are far from being fully implemented.
Its Commissioners have repeatedly shown in their reports (www.sccommissioners.org),
how the orders are regularly violated and how implementation varies widely across the
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country. In particular, the Court can do very little to address administrative incapacity
and/or apathy, especially in a federal context like India’s, where the implementation of
government schemes is in the hands of 29 different state-level administrations (see
Tillin and Pereira, this special issue). In South Africa, the government has always
accepted the court’s orders but implementation has often been tardy (Berger 2008) and
activists have been required to fight almost as hard for the implementation of the ruling
as they did to win the change it introduced.
While public opinion enables or restricts the role of the courts, they are able at times to
shape that opinion – the Indian court in particular has influenced social policy by
stimulating debate on the rights of the most disadvantaged sections of the society. The
most visible outcome of this debate has been the promulgation of right-based laws
during the UPA governments (2004-14). These included the Mahatma Gandhi National
Rural Employment Guarantee Act (2005) that established the right to work; the Right
to Education Act (2009), which made education free and compulsory for children aged
6-14; the National Food Security Act (2013) which significantly expanded food
security programmes and gave legal backing to the Midday Meal Scheme and the
Public Distribution System and to a few provisions of the ICDS. Supporters of these
laws within and outside government used the court’s rulings to pressure policy-makers,
informally (Interviews, activists and officials, New Delhi between 1/2013 and 8/2013)
and in Parliament: ‘virtually all of India’s new rights-based acts credit prior landmark
judgments by the Supreme Court’ (Ruparelia 2013b: 36). Its rulings have also forced
the government to justify its policy priorities to public opinion. Thus the government
has only rarely argued that financial constraints are a good reason to limit its
commitment to the welfare of the poor, as doing this would have called for an official
explanation of why, for example, it spent about 5 per cent of the GDP in tax concessions
for the better off (Dreze and Sen 2013).
In South Africa, the court has operated mostly within an implied consensus between it
and the government (as well as important sections of public opinion). For this reason,
its attempt to influence the public debate have been less obvious. But, besides its
interventions in the housing, health and education debates, activist organisations have
sought to use it not only in the hope of securing favourable rulings but also as a means
of publicising unpopular causes such as protecting the poor from evictions.
This context explains both the limits and possibilities of courts’ role in social policy. It
shows, as this article has repeatedly stressed, why courts can only influence policy if
they recognise the limits of their power and respect both the mandate of elected
governments and the agency of citizens. But it suggests too that, if they share a
perspective with the governing elite, and are able to rely on – or create – significant
public legitimacy, they can play a key role in nudging society towards social policies
which are more likely to recognise the needs of the poor – and, if South African
experience is a guide, to enable citizens who are able to act collectively to do so more
effectively and so to ensure that policy is not only about the poor, but is a product of
their choices and actions.
ENDNOTES
1 On the abuse of PIL in India and the frivolous use of this instrument see Devi 2009. India’s Supreme
Court has issued rulings and orders on a very wide variety of subjects that cannot be covered here. See,
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among others, Devi 2009; Shankar and Mehta 2008; Rajagopal 2007; Gauri 2009; Yusuf 2001; Sathe
2002
2 The heated debate that accompanied the introduction of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act is a good example. See Chopra 2011.
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